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IN THE

SUPRE~m

COURT OF THE

ST:\TE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
Case No. 16914
ROBERT KIRK ECHEVARRIETA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was

charge~

with having knowingly and

intentionally produced marijuana, a Schedule I controlled
substance, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted-in the District Court of
the Fourth Judicial District of Utah County, State of Utah,
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding, on the 16th day
of January, 1980.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant respectfully requests that, on the
basis of the grounds herein set forth, his conviction be
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reversed and that he be released from the custody of the
State of Utah forthwith.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 9, 1979, the appellant and his wife
were staying at their parents' home in Goshen, Utah.
Record 61:21).

At the same time, they were visiting

(Trial
the

house of appellant's older brother in Santaquin in order
to check on the house and care for the yard while the
brother was out of town.

( T. R. 6 2 : l) .

Anothe-r, younger

brother of the appellant also had access to the Santaquin
house and yard at the time.
The house belonging to appellant's older brother
is situated on a large lot on the corner of two roads, on
the northwest corner of the intersection.

The house is

separated from the roads on its south and east by large
trees and yards and various types of shrubbery.

The front

door is on the east side of the house, with a walkway
leading from the sidewalk to the door.

The carport and

driveway are also on the east side, toward the north end
of the house.
The kitchen door is on the southwest corner of the
house, where there is a kind of private driveway leading
from the door to the road on the south of the house.

Just

east of the kitchen door is a living room window on the
south side of the house, and west of the south driveway
and kitchen door is the back yard.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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On the afternoon of the 9th of October,

1

~tr.

Walter Smith of Santaquin went to the house to read the
water meter.

He did not know the location of :je meter

beforehand and had to search the yard for it.

Coming from

the neighboring house on the north of the house in question,
he left the public sidewalk on the east side of the house
and entered the front yard.

Not finding the meter on the

east side of the house, he angled across the corner of the
house to the south side of the yard and found the meter
located on the property line near the road on the south
edge of the yard, about 50 feet from the house.

(Hearing

Record 11:26).
While in the yard, Mr. Smith observed the following:
two flower pots in the living room window containing single
plants of a height between one, and one and a half inches
tall (H.R.12:15, 28:5), a large metal washtub near the
kitchen door containing several plants of heights between
two and six inches (H.R.13:28), and two white five-gallon
plastic buckets in the back yard, west of the private
driveway, each containing two to four plants between five
and six inches tall

(H.R.28:26, 29:28).

Mr. Smith recog-

nized the plants from a course that he had taken in law
enforcement, and concluded that they were marijuana.
Within half an hour, Mr. Smith had notified Officer
Gary McGiven who went directly to the property, without a
search warrant, to confirm the report.

Officer McGiven
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walked directly onto the property and examined the plants
close-up.

He admitted that the weeds on the property were

about a foot higher than the edge of the metal tub, and
that the plants extended only a couple inches over the edge
of the tub.

(H.R.27:12, 16:14).

The weeds in the back

yard were also higher than the tops of the five-gallon
buckets (H.R.27:13).

As to the plants in the window,

Officer McGiven testified that he had to get right next to
them to see what they were (H.R.28:11).

In short, none of

the plants could be identified from the street or from any
other public property (H.R.26:9-16, 16:14).

The officer

did not in fact attempt to observe them from a public
place (H.R.24:26) and although he could have gotten a
search warrant that day, he failed to do so but rather·
went directly onto the property to search for the reported
plants (H.R.24:2, 24:30).
Having concluded that the plants were marijuana,
the officer established surveillance from behind a fence
on the north end of the back yard.

The metal tub had been

moved to a position about ten feet inside that fence
(H.R.37:12) so that from the fence the officer could see
the tub ten feet away and the two plastic buckets at the
south end of the yard about 90 feet away (H.R.23:11).
was not shown who had moved the tub.

It

At about 6:00 p.m.

on the 12th, the fourth day of the surveillance, the
officer observed the appellant come out of the house and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

water the plants in the two plastic buckets 90 feet away
(H.R.35:7, T.R.20:7, 22:16).

Appellant was never observed

watering or caring in any way for any of the other plants,
nor taking care of the plants in the buckets on any other
occasion (T.R.22:22, 23:5).

He was only seen watering

those in the buckets, and was never observed near the other
plants.

Appellant's brother (not the owner of the house

but a younger brother) however, was observed near the metal
tub, apparently checking the plants.
Having observed the appellant

watering the plants

in the buckets, Officer McGiven and others arrested the
appellant and his wife.

They had no warrant to

arrest

appellant or to search the property, but nonetheless took
him into custody and seized all the plants in the yard
which appeared to be marijuana (H.R.31:24-27).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INITIAL SEARCH BY THE POLICE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH A.1'1.ENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, AND ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF
THAT SEARCH SHOULD F..AVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
Based upon the facts of the case outlined above,

appellant made a motion to suppress all evidence of the
marijuana plants found growing at the Santaquin house.
That motion was denied after a hearing held immediately
before appellant's trial.

Appellant submits that the denial

of that motion was error and that all such evidence should
have been suppressed.

Since the evidence was crucial to
-5-
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the State's case, its erroneous admission is grounds for
reversal.
The first issue to resolve is whether there was in
fact a search or seizure for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.

The courts make a distinction between those

cases in which, before such an observation is possible, the
officer intrudes upon the protected privacy of the suspect.
In the first instance, no search or seizure occurs for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment; but in the second, the
intrusion of the officer upon the constitutionally protected
privacy of the suspect invokes the requirements of the
Amendment that such intrusion be authorized by a warrant
or be in conformance with certain well-defined exceptions
to the warrant requirement.
The scope of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment is delineated in the case of Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 14 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

There,

the United States Supreme Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. [Citation]
But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
88 S.Ct. at 511.
[Emphasis
added] .

'

Thus, if a person exposes the evidence or fruits of a crime
to the public, he very likely forfeits the protection of
the Fourth Amendment because the officer's observation of
-6-
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that evidence would not constitute a "search" under t-_:~~e
Fourth Amendment.

However, if the person has sought to

protect his property from public scrutiny, any observation
of that property would have to meet the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.

The officer would either have to

obtain a warrant to search or be able to justify his search
under one of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement.
A number of cases have applied the Katz rule to
facts very similar to those of this case.

Although Katz

itself dealt with electronic surveillance, its rationale
applies equally well to searches of the private property
of citizens.

In such cases, the court seeks to determine

whether the accused held a "reasonable expection of privacy"
in his property at the time when the police conducted a
search.
For example, in Lorenzana v. Superior Court of Los
.::rngeles County, 9 Cal.3d 626, 108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d
33 (Calif. 1973), in which the California Supreme Court
overruled several prior California cases such as People v.
Bradley, 81 Cal. Rptr. 459, 460 P.2d 129 {1969), the Court
considered a similar case in which the police received
information that a suspect was selling drugs at his home.
Officers oroceeded to the address without first obtaining
Jo:

a warrant either to search the house or to arrest the suspect.

The house was a single family home, set back about
-7-
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70 feet from the sidewalk, with entrances on the west side
and the rear.

On the east side of the house there were no

doors or pathways but there was a strip of grass-and-dirtcovered ground 6 to 10 feet wide separating the side of
the house from the edge of the driveway of the house next
door.

The officers, rather than approach the house using

the paths to the front door, walked up the neighbor's
driveway and crossed over this strip of ground to a window
on the east side of the house.

From the driveway, they

could see nothing through the window.

But from a position

about six inches from the window, they could see into the
house through a space in the curtains.

It was necessary

to cross the ground and be within six inches of the window
to observe anything inside.

From that position, where they

had no permission from the defendant to be, they could see
the defendant inside involved in a heroin transaction.
On the basis of that evidence, the defendant was arrested
and convicted.
In deciding whether the Fourth Amendment requirements
were applicable to the officers in that case, the court
applied the test of Katz.

Under the facts, the court framed

the issue as whether the police were making their observations from a position on a part of the house's surrounding
property which was in some manner expressly or impliedly
opened to the public and to public use:
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These cases clearly demonstrate the salutarv
rule of law that observations of things in ·
plain sight made from a place where a police
officer has a right to be do not amount to a
search in the constitutional sense. On the
other hand when observations are made from a
position to which the officer has not been
ex ressly or im liedl invited, the intrusion
is unlaw ul unless executed pursuant to a warrant
or one of the established exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
511 P.2d at 39.
[Emphasis added.]
Finding that the officer in the case did not have express
invitation to cross the defendant's property to a position
six inches from his window, the court considered whether
such invitation could be implied from any facts which
might indicate that the property was opened to public use
generally.

Examining the physical characteristics of the

house and yard, the court stated:
None of this evidence could support a finding
that normal approach to the Lorenzana home
would lead the public to within six inches of
the window in question . . . . The record reveals
no substantial evidence supporting a conclusion
that a normal access route to either the
Lorenzana home or the house behind it on the
same lot would lead to a point within a scant
six inches from the window through which the
officers made their observations; thus, those
observations were made from a position where
the officers had no right to be.
Id. at 40-41
Thus, the court reasoned that where a party has
developed his property in such a way that a normal access
route to the house is provided and clearly defined, though
other routes may be possible and other areas of the
property accessible to the public in the sense that there
are no fences or barriers erected to prevent passage,

-9-
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that party has indicated his intention to allow public
access by the normal route but to preserve his privacy in
all other areas.

Police officers intruding in those other
~

areas, away from the normal access route, must meet the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

The court explained:

the generic Katz rule permits the resident
of a house to rely justifiably upon the privacy
of the surrounding areas as a protection from
the peering of the officers unless such residence is "exposed" to that intrusion by the
existence of public pathways or other invitation
to the public to enter upon property.
This
justifiable reliance on the privacy of the noncommon portion of the property surrounding one's
residence thus leads to the particular rule
that searches conducted without a warrant from
such parts of the property always are unconstitutional unless an exception to the warrant
requirement applies.
Id. at (2.
Similar conclusions were reached in the cases of Jenkins
v. State, 248 So.2d 758,

(Ct.Crim.App.Alab. 1971) and

Olivera v. State, 315 So.2d 487

(Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1975).

The fact that the evidence in this case was found
lying in the yard by officers walking around the yard
rather than by

loo~ing

through drawn curtains or standing

only inches away from the house itself is not significant.
In Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968),
officers investigating the theft of trees from federal
lands went to the

residenc~

of the defendant and found a

stockpile of trees next to his home, among some standing
trees and in a pile only 20 to 35 feet from the building
and a mere 5 feet from a public parking place.

The defen-

dant's home itself was a resort lodge, open to the public,
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and the primary issue in the case was whether the area
where the trees were piled was property which the defendant
sought to protect as private ..

The pile was in plain view

of the parking lot, but in order to determine if the trees
were stolen, the officers had to step onto the property
and examine the trees close up.

The court held that though

the pile of trees was on property which was unenclosed by
any kind of fence and was bordered only by the curb of the
parking lot, it was still apparently meant to be protected
as private by the defendant, since there were no paths onto
that part of the property from any public area which could
be considered normal approaches to the residence.

The

court concluded:
A more appropriate test in determining if a
search and seizure adjacent to a house is constitutionally forbidden is whether it constitutes an intrusion upon what the resident seeks
to preserve as private even in an area which,
although adjacent to his house, is accessible
to the public. ·. • . There can be no doubt that
Wattenburg, in placing the stockpile this close
to his place of residence, sought to protect
it from this kind of government intrusion.
388 F.2d at 857.
Similarly, in Black v. State, 168 S.E.2d 916 (Ct.
App.Ga. 1969), the court held that entry upon a person's
:ront yard for the purpose of examining possibly stolen
property was unlawful.

There, the police suspected that

the resident of a home had stolen an automobile engine.
rlrriving at the home without a warrant to search or arrest,
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they saw a motor hanging from a tree in the front yard, but
were unable to see from the path to the front door whether
there were marks on the motor which would identify it as
the stolen one.

Walking over to the tree, they examined

the motor close up and determined that it was stolen.

The

court on appeal, however, determined that this intrusion
violated the Fourth Amendment, since,

althoug~

the area

was unenclosed, it was a part of the property which the
suspect meant to preserve as private.

As soon as the police

stepped off the path to the front door, which was the
normal access route to the entrance of the home, they were
conunitting an unlawful intrusion.
Buchanan, 4 32 S. W. 2d 3 42

See also State v.

(Mo. 19 6 8) and Durham v .· State,

471 S.W.2d 527 (Ark. 1971).
In the present case, there was clearly sufficient
evidence brought out at the suppression hearing to establish
that the evidence of the presence of marijuana plants on
the property in question was obtained as a result of a
search that violated the Fourth Amendment.

Here, the only

normal and apparent public approaches to the entrance of
the Santaquin house were the carport driveway on the northeast corner of the house and the path leading from the
east road to the front door, also on the east side of the
house.

Neither of these normal public access routes was

anywhere near the window where the potted plants were
observed, nor were either of the routes close to the kitchen
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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door, near which the metal tub was locat2·1.

Both the

window and the kitchen door were in the south side of the
house, completely opposite and isolated from the normal
approaches to the public entrance of the house.

There was

certainly no express or implied invitation to the public
to enter the back yard, where the plastic buckets were
located.
Further, it is clear that the area where the plants
were found was an area which the owner of the house sought
to preserve as private.

As stated, that side of the house

was far from the public approaches to the main entrance.
That side of the house faced away from any neighboring
house, and yet was sufficiently distant from the road that
it would be impossible for anyone to observe the plants
from any public property as long as they remained small.
Even the fact that the water meter was on that side of the
house does not tend to negate the fact that the owner
sought to protect his privacy there, since the meter was
at least 50 feet away from the house, from which distance
the plants could not be recognized.

The presence of a

makeshift driveway was also not an invitation to public
access, since it was a private driveway, located in an
area which was not intended to be a normal, public a?proach
to the house.
Because of these facts, when the officer left the
public street and public sidewalk and entered the property

-13-
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of the appellant to observe the plants, he intruded upon
an area in which the appellant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy.

Even though the planters thermselves may have

been in plain view from the street, the facts show that
the plants could not be recognized from that distance.
Since the officer had no warrant to search, and could not
justify his search on the basis of any exception to the
warrant requirement, his search was unlawful.

All evidence

of the presence of marijuana, obtained as a result of that
search, should have been suppressed.

Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed2d 441 (1963).
II.

ALL EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF MARIJUANA EXCEPT THAT·
RELATING TO THE PLANTS IN THE PLASTIC BUCKETS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AS IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL TO
THE DEFENDANT.
During the trial, it was established that the only

observation which connected the appellant to any of the
marijuana was the officer's testimony that the appellant
watered the plants in the two white plastic buckets.
(T.R.22:22, 23:5).

There was no evidence that the appellant

was connected in any way with the other plants.

After

the presentation of evidence concerning those other plants,
the appellant therefore moved to exclude such evidence,
since it constituted evidence which was irrelevant as to
his offense.
58:14).

That motion was denied.

(T.R.52:8-53:15,

The appellant respectfully submits that the denial

of his motion was improper and that the admission of the
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evidence of the other plants was highly prejudicial and
constituted reversible error.
It is well established that generally where a
defendant is charged with a specific offense, evidence
against him will be admitted only if it is relevant to
that offense.

If there is no apparent connection between

an item of evidence and the offense of the defendant,
that evidence must be excluded, especially where it might
prejudice the jury against the defendant.
In a very similar case, the Supreme Court of
Oregon held such unconnected evidence to be inadmissible
and highly prejudicial.

In State v. Hall, 523 P.2d 556

(Ore. 1974), a suspect shared a four-bedroom home with a
married couple.

On the occasion in question, the police

raided the home to search for drugs and found, among other
things, 95 grams of marijuana in the couple's bedroom.
The presence of that marijuana in the home was admitted
into evidence in the trial of the suspect for possession
of marijuana, although the suspect argued that it was inadrnissible against him.

The court reversed his conviction,

stating:
On oral argument, the State conceded that the
95 grams of marijuana found in the west bedroom
was erroneously admitted.
This concession was
well warranted. The evidence was uncontroverted
that the west bedroom was occupied by the Spikes.
Nothing produced at trial indicated that petitioner had any right of access to this room,
nor that he had actual or constructive possession
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the marijuana in that room.
This conclusion
alone requires reversal because we cannot be
certain that the jury did not rely on this evidence in finding petitioner guilty.
523 P.2d
at 558.
Thus, the court held that where there was no evidence
tending to connect the defendant with the presence of the
marijuana, its admission was highly prejudicial and required
reversal ..
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 330 N.E.2d 502
Ct.Mass. 1975), a similar conclusion was reached.

(App.
There,

the police had kept a house under surveillance and had
observed two defendants entering and leaving the house on
numerous occasions.

Executing a search warrant, the police

met one of the defendants at· the door and found another in
bed in a bedroom.

They further found heroin in the kitchen

and arrested both the men for possession of heroin.

On

appeal, the court held that where there was no evidence
that either was owning or renting the home which might
establish constructive possession, nor any evidence that
either of them had any form of dominion or control over
the kitchen area of the house or even of the apartment as
a whole, there was simply no connection between the suspects and the contraband, and the presence of the heroin
in the kitchen was not competent evidence against them.
In People v. Miller, 268 N.E.2d 213 (App.Ct.Ill.
1971), a court held that evidence of narcotics and paraphernalia which could not be directly connected with the
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defendant should have been excluded and its admission

w.1s

highly prejudicial and constituted reversible error.

In

another case of the same name, P2col-2 v. Miller, 328 P.2d
506 (Dist.Ct.App.Calif. 1958), a court similarly ordered
reversal where evidence of the presence of marijuana near
an individual's apartment was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

There, the court explained:
The court clearly committed error in the
admission of the marijuana.
it was not only
separated from appellant by space but by time
as well . .
. Nothing was produced in evidence
to connect appellant with it in any way . . .
Something more than mere suspicion must be
shown and appellant's connection with this
marijuana does not rise above the level of
pure guess and conjecture. * * * The prejudice
to appellant from the introduction of this
very large cache of marijuana is clear, and
this was aggravated by the court's reiterated
statement that the jury "has a right to consider it."
In the present case, there was similarly no evidence

tending to connect the appellant with any plants other than
those in the white plastic buckets.
any of the other plants.

He was never seen near

It is true that the plants in the

tub were moved, but the conclusion that the appellant
moved them is pure guesswork and mere conjecture, not sufficient to make those plants relevant to appellant's
alleged offense.

The fact that appellant's younger brother,

one not living at that home, was in fact seen near the tub
of plants serves to further add to the uncertain nature of
any connection between appellant and those plants, since

-17-
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it could easily have been the brother who moved the tub.
Furthermore, the fact that the appellant had some
access to the yard and to the house is not sufficient to
establish the necessary connection between him and the
plants, as illustrated in the cases

above~

Exclusive con-

trol of a premises may serve to create a presumption that
the person in control has possession of all objects on the
premises, but where there is joint possession, there must
be further circumstances establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the suspect exercised some form of dominion or
control over the object.
(Mo. 1975).

State v. Wiley, 522 P.2d 281

Here, if the appellant had possession of the

premises at all, it was shared with his wife, his younger
brother who was present at the same time, and with his
older brother, the owner of the house.

In order for his

access to the premises to serve as a justification for
admitting evidence of the plants, there would have to be
other circumstances connecting him with them.

In this case,

there were simply no facts connecting appellant with these
other plants, and the admission of evidence concerning
them was erroneous.
That the admission of evidence concerning the
plants in the metal tub was prejudicial to the appellant
and requires reversal is clear from the fact that the only
plants positively identified as marijuana at the trial
were plants from the metal tub.

(T.R.26:4-9).

There was
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no direct testimony by any expert witness that the plants
which the appellant actually was seen watering were marijuana plants.
~xcluded

Thus, if the plants in the tub had been

as required b~ the law, there would have been

insufficient evidence to convict the appellant; their
admission therefore was highly prejudicial and requires
reversal.
Even if the court could have been justified in
finding a connection between the appellant and the other
plants, their admission would still have been improper
under the general rule that evidence of a defendant's other
crimes or wrongful acts is inadmissible for the purpose of
degrading his character or to establish his propensity to
commit the crime in question.

If the appellant were shown

to be connected to the other plants, his connection with
them could only establish that, in regards to them, he was
in unlawful possession of them.

But evidence of his

unlawful possession of other plants, constituting allegations of other crimes, would be excluded under Rules 47
and 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
In State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978),
those rules are summarized as follows:
The rules of evidence require rejection of
evidence of specific behavior to prove a
character trait except evidence of conviction
of crime.
The rule, of course, is different
where the evidence of other crimes or civil
wrongs is relevant to prove some other material

-19-
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fact such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity.
In State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232

(Utah 1975), the rule

is stated thus:
The general rule is that in a criminal case
evidence which shows or tends to show that
the defendant had committed another crime in
addition to that for which he is on trial is
inadmissible.
However, an exception to the rule
is that evidence of another crime is admissible
when it tends to establish motive; intent;
absence of mistake or accident; or to show a
common scheme or plan embracing commission of
similar crimes so related to each other that
the proof of one tends to establish the crime
for which the defendant is on trial.
In the present case, where the appellant was charged
with the cultivation of the plants in the white buckets but
evidence was introduced which tended to show his possession
of other plants, none of the exceptions to the general rule
of inadmissibility are applicable.

Here, the presence of

the other plants adds nothing to the establishment of the
appellant 1 s motive, intent, or knowledge, because there was
nothing in the evidence which tended to show that he had
any motive, intent, or knowledge or undertook any act of
cultivation with respect to those other plants.

No infer-

ence as to motive, intent, or knowledge arises from his
alleged possession of the other plants which does not arise
from his watering of the plants in the white buckets.

And

since the only evidence of his motive, intent, or knowledge
as to the plants in the white buckets arose from a statutory
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presumption based upon his cultivation, Section 58-37-8(11)
U.C.A., the additional evidence of the other plants therefore added nothing.
Nor does the presence of the other pl3nts establish
a plan which would tend to verify his cultivation of the
plants in the white buckets, since absent a showing that
he watered or did any other act constituting "cultivation''
of any other plants, there would be no inference from his
connection with the other plants which would support the
charge of cultivation of the plants in the white buckets.
Certainly, proof of some connection between him and the
other plants, or of his possession of those plants, does
not tend to prove the fact that he watered the plants in
the white buckets, for which he is charged.
Therefore, since the evidence of the other plants
could be offered only if he was in possession of those plants,
and such evidence would be evidence only of other crimes of
the appellant, it would be inadmissible under the general
rule.

As such evidence does not fit any of the adopted

exceptions in this case, it should have been excluded.
III.

FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA
WAS ERROR.

During the trial, appellant requested that the court
deliver to the jury two instructions, one detailing the
elements of the offense of simple possession of marijuana
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as prohibited by Section 58-37-8(2) (a) (i), U.C.A., and the
other instructing the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of simple
possession of marijuana.
refused by the court.

Both these instructions were

Appellant respectfully submits that

such refusal was erroneous, since simple possession of
marijuana is a lesser included offense of manufacture of
marijuana, and since in this case the jury may have found
insufficient evidence on the greater charge but sufficient
evidence on the lesser charge.
Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i) provides:
Except as authorized by this act, it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) To produce, manufacture,·or dispense, or to
possess with intent to produce, manufacture,
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit
substance.
Section 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) provides:
It shall be unlawful:
(i) For any person knowingly and intentionally
to possess or use a controlled substance .
Violation of the former provision, with respect to marijuana,
carries a felony sentence.

Violation of the latter, with

respect to marijuana, a misdemeanor sentence, for first
offenses.
former.

The latter is clearly a lesser offense than the
The issue here is whether it is an included offense.

An offense is included in another if there is no
element of the former which is not also an element of the
latter.

On the basis of the statutes and the usual definitions
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of the terms therein, it is clear that simple possession
of marijuana includes no element which is not 3lso an element of production of marijuana.
for each is the same.

The mental state required

As to the substantive elements of

each, Section 58-37-2 defines "possession" as including
"joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding,
swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distribution, of controlled substances."

It defines

"production" as "manufacturing, planting, cultivation,
growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance," and
"manufacture" as "production, preparation, propagation,
compounding, or processing of a controlled substance."
In the instant case, the conduct of the appellant
which satisfies the definition of production or manufacture
was his watering of the marijuana plants.

However, such

conduct also fits the definition of possession, for it
constitutes "maintaining" the plants, at least, and arguably requires the exercise of some degree of "control" or
"retaining" at the moment that the conduct occurs.

Therefore,

as applied to the facts of this case, the conduct of the
appellant satisfies both the simple possession statute and
the production statute, and there is no element of the
simple possession statute, as applied to his conduct, which
is not also an element of the production statute.

Since

the evidence could have been found by the jury insufficient
for the greater but sufficient for the lesser offense, the
appellant was entitled to an instruction on the lesser 8ffense.
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IV.

THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE
OFFENSE CHARGED INCLUDED THE ELEMENT OF INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE WAS PH.EJUDICIAL ERROR.
During the trial, appellant also requested an

instruction defining the offense as including, as an element
of the crime, the intent to distribute the controlled substance.

However, the court's instruction on the elements

of the offense, Instruction No. 6, did not include that
element as an element of the offense charged.

Appellant

submits that that failure by the court constituted reversible error since the statute under which he was charged,
Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i), includes as an element the intent
to distribute or "dispense."
Section 58-37-8 (1) (a) (i) makes it a felony:
.To produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to
possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance.
'rhe language of subsection (a) (i) is ambiguous as to the
application of the words "with intent to" to the operative
words "produce, manufacture or dispense."
Generally, acts constituting production could
hardly be viewed as inherently more culpable than those
constituting possession, especially where production is
for one's own use and not for sale.

Indeed, some states

have provided by statute that production which is not for
the purpose of distribution shall not be subject to the
same penalty as production which is for the purpose of
distribution, since production for pne's own use is
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essentially equivalent, in moral culpability, to simple
possession.

(See North Carolina G.S. 90-87(15) and State

v. Whitted,

205 S.E.2d 611.)

In this case, evidence at

trial showed approximately a dozen plants, the largest of
which was five inches high.

Production or cultivation

would, in most circumstances, involve possession of the
substance.
In light of the fact that simple production for one's
own use is inherently no more culpable than simple possession,

a misdemeanor offense, the statute prohibiting pro-

duction should be interpreted, if possible, to apply the
same penalty to simple production as is applied to simple
possession.

Since the Utah statute prohibiting production

is ambiguous, it can and should be interpreted in such a
way that production is a felony only if it involves an intent
to distribute.

In other words, Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i)

should be read in such a way that one element of production
under that section, which makes production a felony, is an
intent to distribute.

Simple production, which is inher-

ently a misdemeanor, would be prosecutable under the simple
possession section, Section 58-37-8(2) (a} (i).
In the present case, this conclusion mandates the
result that the appellant was entitled to an instruction
that the offense for which he was charged, production under
§58-37-8(1) {a) (i), included the element of intent to distribute or dispense, since under that section he was subject
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to a felony penalty.

The giving of the court's instruction

which omitted that element, and the court's failure to give
the appellant's requested instruction, constituted reversible error, particularly in light of the fact that the
court also refused to give the appellant's requested instruction on the lesser included offense of simple possession,
which would have been appropriate in this case where there
was no evidence of the appellant's intent to distribute the
marijuana and which would have been the proper offense to
charge since the evidence tended to show only simple production, inherently a misdemeanor.
V.

APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL IN THIS MATTER SINCE
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY A CONVICTION.
On appeal, the test of the sufficiency of the evi-

dence at trial is whether the evidence presented was suff icient to establish a prima f acie case of every element

of the crime charged.

If there was not enough evidence on

any element to enable the jury to reach a verdict of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, then a conviction must be reversed.
In the present case, there were several elements
on which there was not sufficient evidence to enable the
jury to reach a justifiable verdict.

First, in regards tQ

the element of intent to distribute, as discussed above,
the State presented no evidence at all concerning the
appellant's intent to distribute the marijuana in the future.
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Considering the fact that the appellant was only a guest in
the house and was only temporarily taking care of the property, the only reasonable inference from the evidence as
as whole was that he had no intent at all regarding the
future of the marijuana.

He could not contemplate having

control of it in the future, and therefore could not possibly have had an intent to sell it.
On the element of knowledge and intention as to the
conduct of the appellant, it is provided at Section 58-37-8(11)
that any evidence of production will raise the presumption
that the suspect acted with knowledge of the character of
the substance produced.

However, such a presumption is

rebuttable, and is particularly vulnerable under circumstances where, as here, it is shown that a suspect is not
the actual owner of the substance but was, if anything,
temporarily performing a service.

In this case, evidence

that the appellant was merely visiting the home for the
purpose of caring for the house and yard was sufficient to
rebut the statutory presumption that he knew that any of
the plants were marijuana.

In the absence of the presump-

tion, there is nothing in the record, nor in the statements
of the appellant himself (T.R.44:9-20), that would indicate
that the appellant had ever seen marijuana before, had been
told that there was marijuana in the yard, or that he knew
from any other source that there was marijuana in the plastic
buckets that he was seen watering.

-27-
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Even more crucial to the question of sufficiency
of the evidence is the fact that there was no evidence in
the case establishing to a sufficient moral certainty that
the plants in the plastic buckets were marijuana.

As pointed

out before, the evidence indicated only that the plants in
the metal tub were analyzed by an expert and determined to
be marijuana.

Such a finding has no rational connection

to any other location or object on the premises, unless it
can somehow be inferred that every potted plant on the
yard in question was a marijuana plant.

The failure of the

State to present competent evidence that the buckets contained marijuana negates the inference that when he watered
the plants in the buckets, he was cultivating marijuana.
Since the evidence was therefore insufficient on
the elements of the presence of a controlled substance,
the mental state of the appellant, and the specific intent
t.o distribute a controlled substance in the future, the
State failed to present a prima facie case under Section
58-37-8(1) (a) (i) and the case should not have been submitted to the jury.

To allow the conviction was reversible

error.
During the trial, appellant moved to dismiss the
case on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence on the
elements of the offense.

That motion was denied.

The

appellant respectfully requests that the conviction be
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reversed on the grounds that that dismissal should properly
have been granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant-Appellant requests the Court to reverse
the conviction and judgment entered against the defendant
in the trial court and remand the case for vacating of
that judgment.
DATED this

day of April, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

1

~{A,J~1
SCHU~Hi:R
~

ROBERT J.
Attorney for Ap'Pellant
MAILING

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed 11 copies of the
foregoing Brief Of Appellant, to the Utah Supreme Court,
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and 3 copies of
the same to the Office of the Utah Attorney General at 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114, this c:<S-?i-day

of April, 1980.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-29-

